




The Muslim Veil Controversy and European Values

Linda Woodhead, Lancaster University

For Europe, there can be no more important instance of inter-cultural encounter today than the encounter with Islam. The Muslim veil has become a key symbol of this encounter, and a focal point of controversy and strong feeling. By focusing on this topic, it is possible to illuminate wider issues to do with the contact between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’ and a clash between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ values and narratives. 

Although it is widely controversial throughout Europe, different countries have different policies and regulations on veiling. At one extreme, there is prohibition on veiling in public places – as in France, Turkey, and some parts of Germany. At the other extreme there is no regulation – as in the UK, Austria, and Greece. The majority of European countries fall in the middle of this spectrum; they have partial prohibition – for example, a prohibition no veiling for court officials – and some are in the process of debating more extensive prohibition. Everywhere, however, there is heated debate, not least in the UK, which will be the main focus of this paper. In Britain the debate is currently focused not on headcovering (hijab) which is now relatively uncontroversial, but on face veiling (niqab), which is becoming increasingly common, including amongst young British Muslim women from many different backgrounds. 

This situation raises many interesting questions, including: Why has a piece of cloth become the focus of such debate and anxiety? Why is this a particularly European controversy, without a clear parallel in north America? What does it tell us about the place of religion in ‘secular’ societies? I want to address these questions by looking into this controversy in some detail. I am not the first to do so, and a number of interesting books on the topic have recently appeared. Some, like Joppke (2009), consider the topic from the point of view of the political regimes and ideologies of different European countries. Others, like Scott (2007), who focuses on France, consider the significance of different ‘discourses’, including those of religion/laïcité, gender/sexuality, and the tradition of French republicanism. Without in any way neglecting the importance of social, political and economic factors, what I want to do here is offer a largely cultural analysis of the debate. I differ from other approaches in drawing attention the importance of values and, in doing so, I go against the grain of recent work in cultural studies/cultural sociology, which has turned away from values as a major area of concern. 

My argument in what follows is that if we look closely at how public, policy and political debates about the veil are actually being framed, we find not a clash of cultures, civilisations or discourses, but a clash of values. But if we look even more closely, we see that both parties are, in many cases, invoking the same values (like ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’). So to see why there is such heated disagreement, we need to go deeper. My exploration will take us, by way of an unusual mix of sources, including cognitive science, linguistics and moral philosophy, into a deeper investigation of exactly is meant by a ‘value’ and why there can be a clash between people who invoke apparently identical values. If it works, my answer should be able to untangle this conundrum and, at the same time, explain why a small piece of cloth can be the carrier of such deep and often bitter passions. The key, I suggest, lies in the sacred value attributed to secularism and a narrative of secular progress. 

Data and terms
For the past three years I have been leading the UK portion of a three year EU project looking at controversies surrounding the veil in eight European and EU-candidate countries. ​[1]​  Our interest was in public controversies. We used a form of discourse analysis to examine a wide range of media and policy documents, web materials, laws, regulations, and political debates. Our interest was in debates in national media, not in Muslim media. In this lecture I am going to draw mainly on data from the UK, though we did find a lot of similarities in the ways the debates were framed across Europe; what differed was not so much the framings, but the relative weight given to different frames. 

In what follows I use the word ‘covering’ rather than ‘veil’, because the controversies are in fact about a range of bodily coverings: headscarves (hijab), body coverings like jilbab and burqa, and face coverings like niqab. Where necessary I specify which I mean, but the British controversies I examine normally concern face veiling. 

Non-covered actors contra covering

The place to start is with an examination of the main reasons invoked by those who oppose covering. We will see that these reasons are in fact values. Most of the voices of opposition which I discuss are non-Muslim, though there are some Muslims on this side of the debate as well. 
First, freedom is said to be threatened by the practice of covering, and in particular women’s freedom are women’s liberation. It is assumed by many who say this that Muslim women have not freely chosen to cover, and that their menfolk have imposed it on them. Covering is said to subjugate women, marking them as inferior, unequal, different and restricted. It undermines feminism and its gains, including sexual liberation.  It introduces gender difference, subordination and inequality. As the influential British feminist newspaper columnist Polly Toynbee puts it, 
No one need be a Muslim to understand the ideology of the veil, because covering and controlling women has been a near-universal practice in Christian societies and in most cultures and religions the world over. Western women have struggled hard to escape, but not long ago women here were treated as chattels and temptresses, to be owned by men and kept out of men's way, to be chaperoned, hidden, powerless under compulsory rules of "modesty". Women's bodies have been the battle flag of religions, whether it's churching their uncleanness, the Pope forcing them to have babies, the Qur'an allowing wife-beating, Hindu suttee, Chinese foot-binding and all the rest… There is only one answer: a completely secular state.​[2]​  
Notice that Toynbee conflates feminism with secularism. In fact, Secularism and secular progress are the second most frequently cited values invoked against covering. The headscarf or veil are said to be objectionable because they come from an outdated time or place, are not compatible with secular values, and are anti-progressive. Some commentators suggest that the integrity of the secular state is threatened by covering, others say it turns the clock back.  
Third, the values of ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’ are frequently said to be undermined by the practice of covering, especially the niqab, which is presented as making  integration into British society more difficult, and/or inhibiting cohesion. Covering is said to foster ‘difference’ rather than ‘connection’. This set of values was most famously invoked by the senior Labour politician Jack Straw in a highly-publicised and debated newspaper article written in 2006. Straw said: ‘I defend absolutely the right of any woman to wear a headscarf… As for the full veil, wearing it breaks no laws’ but ‘my concern was that wearing the full veil was bound to make better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult. It was such a visible statement of separation and of difference.’​[3]​    
Fourth, the value of security is invoked by some actors in the debate, with covering seen to be a threat to security. Covering is often linked with Islamic extremism, particularly by way of media images. For example, when newspapers carry stories about so-called Muslim terrorism, these stories are often illustrated with images of niqab-wearing women. In fact, there is no clear link between covering and terrorist activity in Britain, although there was a single instance of a criminal trying to escape by donning female face and body covering. 
Finally, in some debates ‘British’ or ‘civic’ values are singled out as incompatible with covering. Sometimes specific values are singled out in this connection, for example fairness, tolerance and politeness. In other documents there is just the assertion that covering is not part of the British way of life. 
It is important to note that very often one or more of these different values – which I have separated out for the purpose of analysis – are run together in an associative way. Here, for example, is an extract from a speech by David Davis, a prominent Conservative politician, which runs together the several of the values I have just identified in a single sentence:  ‘Britain risks social and religious divisions so profound that society's very foundations, such as the freedom of speech, will become “corroded” and the perfect conditions for home-grown terrorism will be created’.​[4]​  This associative way of thinking is, I will argue, very significant, and we need to think more about why and how it happens, for it suggests that something more than a set of separate, ‘rational’ norms are in play. 
Covered actors pro covering

The reasons which are given for covering by those who are themselves covered, and in particular those who wear niqab, are also worth examining. 

The first thing our analysis revealed was that freedom is the most frequently cited value not only by those who are against covering, but also by those who defend and celebrate it. Its importance is made beautifully clear in the ‘alternative Christmas message’ (alternative, that is, to the Queen’s Speech, broadcast every year by the BBC) which was shown on Christmas Day 2006 by Channel 4, in the wake of the Jack Straw controversy mentioned above. ​[5]​  In that year the message was  given by a British Muslim convert who was wearing niqab and named only ‘Khadija’. Khadija begins by emphasising her commitment to the cause of women’s freedom, and she locates herself in the tradition of the suffragettes. By covering she says she is defending women’s freedom, and she says that Britain is a place which such freedom – and religious freedom – is upheld. Another influential example comes from ‘Protect Hijab’, the only organised movement in Britain to defend covering. Tellingly its slogan and website banner runs: ‘Our Choice, Our Freedom, Our Right’.​[6]​ As this example shows, freedom and rights are often cited together, particularly the right to freedom of conscience, expression, and religion. For example, a joint statement issued by a number of Muslim groups in response to Jack Straw’s article: ‘urged people to be supportive for a woman’s right to wear the veil as this complies with the values upon which western civilisation was founded – the protection of human and religious rights’.​[7]​ As another British Muslim woman puts it, ‘The niqab is not about oppression, it means freedom, of faith, of self, of state’.​[8]​  We found that nearly all Muslim women who speak out in national media about their practice of covering begin by insisting that their choice to cover is a free choice, which has not been forced on them by any man. 
 
Second, and again very similarly to those who oppose covering, many Muslim voices in the debate appeal to the value of respect for women and women’s equality. Covering is often presented as a means of resisting the sexualisation of women. Thus Yvonne Ridley’s widely published feature ‘How I came to Love the Veil’ begins by attacking the way in which Islam is branded as sexist, and by claiming that ‘just about everything that Western feminists fought for in the 1970s was available to Muslim women 1,400 years ago. Women in Islam are considered equal to men in spirituality, education, and worth’. By veiling she says she is dressing ‘modestly’, claiming respect, and saying that the attention of ‘leering’ men is ‘not tolerable’. She ironically refers to what the West views as women’s ‘liberation’ by mentioning the victory of ‘Miss Afghanistan’ in the Miss Earth competition, statistics on domestic abuse in the West, and the views of Christians like Pat Robertson.​[9]​ Similarly, Nabila Ferhat on the Protect Hijab website says, ‘I lost my doubts, my desire to be desired. I began to see how preoccupied I had been with my appearance, and how unhappy I was with myself… This body I was given became so precious to me that I wanted to keep it for myself’. Likewise, the syndicated American columnist Sara Bokker in a feature called ‘Why I Shed the Bikini for Niqab’ comments that previous to covering she had been a ‘slave’ to fashion and to men. On covering she suddenly became ‘free’ and ‘peace at being a woman’ for the first time: ‘I no longer spent all my time consumed with shopping, makeup, getting my hair done and working out. Finally, I was free’.​[10]​  

In a third overlap with those who oppose covering, some Muslim women insist that it does not preclude the good of social integration or Britishness. In her ‘Alternative Christmas Message’, Khadija takes pains to establish her credentials as thoroughly, and loyally, British. She says she is looking forward to celebrating Christmas with her family, and she speaks of Britain as being ‘the best country to live in if you wish to be able freely to practice your religion’.  Distancing herself explicitly from Jack Straw’s comments, she says that niqab is ‘not about separation’, and that her choice to wear it has nothing to do with wanting to cut herself off from society. In fact, her cousin is serving with the British army in Afghanistan. 
 
The fourth value invoked in support of covering is, however, less likely to be heard on the other side of the debate: the value of ‘religion’, ‘spirituality’, or ‘piety’ (all these words are used).  These appeals tend, however, to take place in relation to other values, especially freedom. As a statement on the Protect Hijab website outs it: ‘Today, niqab is the new symbol of women’s liberation to find who she is, what her purpose is, and the type of relation she chooses to have with her creator’. Likewise, another woman on the same site says that covering has reunited her with ‘my spirituality and true value as a human being’.  

A final common reason given for covering invokes the value of group belonging. Some defend covering as a practice which enables women to assert their Muslim identity, identify with other Muslims, and stand up for an identity which is under attack. Others say that covering is not just about belonging, but about asserting the value of community or the family or mutual support against pervasive western individualism. This point is also made by other minority religious groups in Britain. For example, two Sikh artists say their art ‘deliberately challenges the high ideal of Individuality - how it's defined and whether it even exists in a society dictated to by peer pressure and fashion trends... it's a visible statement of the anti-individualistic perspective that is so central to Asian philosophy and religion’.​[11]​ We came across similar comments from covered Muslim women. 

Discussion and analysis 

The first point to make is that values are much more important in the controversy over covering than is usually recognised. Here I take issue even with Scott’s The Politics of the Veil (2007). Scott, whose analysis is otherwise sensitive to the cultural dimensions of the controversy. But Scott’s vision is limited by her reduction of culture to ‘discourse’. Thus she characterises the clash between laïcité and covering, or between a Muslim and a Western approach to sexuality, as a clash of discourses. As she writes, ‘I would say that [French schoolgirls who chose to wear headscarves] wanted to operate in a discursive system different from the French one in which they found themselves’ (2007: 155). In saying this Scott reflects common practice in much recent gender studies, as well as in Cultural Studies; the towering influence of Foucault is clear. But this reduction of culture to discourse can obscure important aspects of the covering controversy. As the analysis of reasons for and against covering which I have just presented shows, there is in fact more by way of overlap than of clash between so-called discourses – with the ‘discourses’ of freedom and liberation, for example, happily employed on both sides of the debate. It is therefore more accurate and helpful to say that the controversy has to do with values than with the broader and blunter notion of ‘discourses’. 





A number of linked developments, including rapid advances in neurological science, are changing our understanding of cognition, i.e. of how we make sense of the world.  To put it in a nutshell, the view that cognition is first and foremost about the mind’s ability to grasp the world by way of abstract concepts – ideas which represent the world and bring it to consciousness – is being rendered implausible. As Mark Johnson puts it in The Meaning of the Body (2007), we must abandon representational models of cognition and the mind, along with the view that ‘our capacity to grasp meanings, and our capacity for reasoning, depends on our conscious use of symbolic representations in the mind that somehow relate to things outside the mind’ (2007: 8). Instead, we must recognise the accumulating scientific evidence that before we consciously think about the world, and long before we employ abstract, general concepts, we feel our way through it in active engagement with it. 

I choose the word ‘feel’ carefully, because it embraces both sensory and emotional experience. Some of our most basic cognitions have to do with how things yield to or resist our bodies: how they reveal themselves to us as hard, soft, warm, crushing, or imposing. In addition, we feel our way through the world emotionally (and, as William James (1884) insisted, emotions are partly physiological). We engage with our worlds and relationships as fearful, disgusting, hopeful, trustworthy, surprising, loving, supportive, and so on. Only at the next stage, usually with the luxury of time and calmness of mood, do we employ our rational and linguistic capabilities to make sense of our world, and to articulate, communicate, and symbolise that sense. 

In other words, our whole picture of cognition is being turned upside down, with the role of body rather than mind being given primacy, with emotions being seen as integral to reasoning, and with relational engagement being privileged over representational detachment. Developments in neurological science, such as those documented and advanced by Antonio Damasio in books with titles like Descartes’ Error (1994) are playing an important role. Work in philosophy of mind, knowledge and meaning is also key, as is earlier phenomenology of emotions, including the work of Merleau Ponty (1962), Norman Denzin (1984) and Robert Solomon (1993). Linguistics is also playing a role. George Lakoff, to take a well known example, draws attention in his many books to the metaphorical nature of language, i.e. to the ways in which we use our sensory encounters to make sense, by analogy, with other aspects of experience – even things as apparently far removed from bodily engagement as this lecture. So you might say in conversation afterwards that it was ‘deep’ or ‘shallow’, ‘transparent’ or ‘opaque’, ‘flimsy’ or ‘substantial’. If you are struggling to make sense of it you might say it is ‘hard’, if not you might say it is ‘a breeze’ or ‘a walk in the park’. 

In co-authored work, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) talk about the fundamental building blocks of cognition as ‘image-schema’, which we glimpse in our dreams. These are recurrent, stable patterns of sensorimotor experience, which are image-like in that they preserve the structure of the perceptual whole, they are at once bodily and mental, and operate dynamically in and across time, linking embodied experiences to conceptualisation and language, and having structures which give rise to ‘constrained inferences’ (Johnson 2007: 144). In other words, they help shape our encounters with the world. When we write, speak, and have inner conversations, we often have a sense of struggling to get the right words to express our deeper cognitions. So we say revealing things like ‘oh that wasn’t what I meant to say’, or ‘let me say that again’, or ‘words cannot express how I am feeling’. Even scientists sometimes speak of scientific discovery as intuitive, as arising from images, hunches and semi-conscious cognitions, which are converted with effort into abstract conceptual, theoretical and mathematical forms (Lakoff and Nunez 2001). 

This new approach to cognition helps us to see why images, symbols and metaphors are so important. I want to go further, and emphasise that we also need to take account of the stories, the narratives in which such symbols are often embedded, and to which their meaning and emotional significance is integrally related. Such narratives also take their form from our embodied encounters with the world, which are not just episodic as lab-based behavioural science and neurology are in danger of forgetting, but which extend through time. Here we learn from religious studies, anthropology, and literary studies. Just as we make sense of our worlds by way of guiding images and symbols, so we make sense of them in terms of sacred stories or ‘myths’. I think the next step is for these established approaches to myth to be engaged more by the developments in cognitive science I have just mentioned. This also makes room for moral philosophy and theology to contribute, for they too have much to say not only about the importance of narrative in general, but about its moral significance. I am thinking, for example, of the narrative and virtue ethics approach of Alasdair MacIntyre in philosophy, of Stanley Hauerwas in moral theology, and of the work of Mary Midgley in books like Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears (2002) and The Myths We Live By (2004), where she has helped expose some of the most influential foundational narratives of modern society, narratives which shape our thoughts, behaviour, and values. 

So I return to values, but now in a position to offer a richer account of what is meant by that. Values have to do with the good life in a good society. We have personal and collective notions of what this is not because we have consciously-elaborated sets of abstract norms to direct our action from the ‘outside’, but because our lives are shaped and saturated with emotively-charged myths, symbols, and narratives which propel us and repel us from the ‘inside’. They exist in dialectical relationship with our unfolding experience, both being shaped by and shaping that experience. They help us make basic sense of our world not first by thinking about it, but by reacting immediately and viscerally to it. 

Such value orientations are not primarily individual but social, both in the sense that they are about more than individual interest (as Kant stresses in his account of the moral), and because they are socially-shaped, transmitted, endorsed, and energised. Sacred objects, stories and symbols are always collective; the national flag, the myth of national origins, the wedding ring, the narrative of romantic love. Values are socially-constructed and socially-validated goods, as Durkheim insists. Moreover, as Durkheim also saw so clearly, values cannot be separated from emotions, and it is this connection which explains their motivational force, and their central significance for morality. People will die for a sacred narrative, or the symbol of the cross, or the national flag. Conversely, they will try to attack, destroy or desecrate symbols and stories which undermine or contradict their own, and those who associate with them. 

So values are not rational, abstract norms – though they can of course be articulated in this way. Behind  abstract, ‘cool’ values like equality, fairness, and freedom, lie ‘hot’ concrete, compelling images and stories which are meaning-ful and action-inspiring. 

Explaining the covering controversy

Armed with an approach to values which is informed by an enlarged understanding of cognition, we can return to the controversy over Muslim covering with a set of sharper tools for making sense of it than ‘discourse’, clash of civilisations, or an eviscerated, rationalistic account of ‘values’ and value-clash. 

This approach may seem to be contradicted, at the outset, by the fact that I have already demonstrated that the controversy is articulated by way of abstract values like freedom and equality. However, it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing with a controversy that focuses on a piece of cloth – a symbol which provokes deep emotional reactions both for and against. Moreover, I have also shown that these abstract values are being used on both sides of the debate – so there is clearly something more involved. What my account of values has to do to prove itself is to be able to explain the previously unexplained dimensions of the debate. It can do this by directing attention beyond the surface level, and trying to discern the emotively-charged symbols and narratives which it would postulate are at play here, symbols and narratives which animate and giving meaning to the abstract values by means of which they are inadequately expressed. 











I call this a European narrative of secular progress, because I think it is particularly powerful for Europeans, and animates much of the political project enshrined in EU. As such, I think it helps explain why this the Muslim covering controversy is a particularly European controversy and why Americans don’t share it, at least with the same intensity. Of course Americans also have a myth of origins based around a movement from oppression to freedom, but it doesn’t identify the former with religion and the latter with secularity, which makes a vital difference. To the contrary, Americans see religion as an integral part of the march of progress, as a force of democracy and freedom, rather than of oppression and enslavement. 

This narrative of secular progress is adaptable. Whilst retaining the shape outlined above, it is adapted into a number of different versions. These include: 

A feminist version:   FROM patriarchy/female oppression  TO gender equality/women’s liberation

A Rationalist/scientific version:  FROM superstition and irrationality TO enlightened, scientific reason

A Romantic/expressivist version: FROM conformity TO individual self-expression 

Part of the power of this sacred narrative resides in the fact that it has these – and other – variations, which fit with the interests of different social groups. Moreover, its power resides in the fact that it has resonance at both personal and public levels, including the national-political level. Like all the most powerful sacred narratives, it illuminates personal experience and relates to national experience and existing political institutions. 

At the national level, it ties in with the idea of a secular welfare state which cares for all. According to this ideal, the state is imagined as a sort of benevolent parent caring for all. All ‘citizens’ contribute, and all are assured of being looked after – whatever their creed, colour or religion. The state is ours, equally, and there is no place for patriarchy, class, or a church which dispenses charity to the deserving poor. Many people still cherish this ideal of the secular welfare state, particularly in Europe. 

But the myth of secular progress has personal, autobiographical resonances for people as well. This goes back to the sixties counter-culture, and what Victor Turner (1977) calls ‘anti-structure’ and ‘communitas’: a state of perfect, spontaneous openness to one another. This is what Talcott Parsons, Robert Bellah, Steven Tipton and Charles Taylor refer to as expressivism. To quote Mary Douglas (1996: xii) who captures it as well as anyone:  ‘the mood was to sweep away rituals, sweep away institutions, and let people be free to speak from the heart’… ‘this world we are in still longs for sincerity, and for simple and direct dealings between equals. It still  rejects the outward forms of social distinction, differences of power and wealth’. Douglas is right. The ideal lives on in various youth cultures, and in a pervasive ideal of spontaneous emotional and physical openness to one another.  As such, it gives personal resonance to the myth of secular progress, and its ideal of open, egalitarian encounter. 

Once you see the multi-layered resonance of this narrative of secular progress, it is much easier to see why Muslim covering upsets this whole applecart, and threatens to undermine what many people hold most sacred – indeed to reverse the whole direction of progress. In this context it is no mystery to see why a piece of cloth constitutes a threat to western civilisation. The Muslim headscarf or face veil or body covering is not interpreted ‘raw’, but is read through different versions of the the narrative of secular progress. Depending on which version is in play, Muslim covering will be immediately felt to threaten: 
 
	the secular state and secular law: hence the otherwise irrational accusation/association that covering is a threat to security and a terrorist menace. This interpretation of covering as undermining the secular state and political order is most powerful for nations whose national identity is most tightly bound up with secularism, like France.

	a European sense of being at the leading edge of progress towards secular, liberal values. This means the narrative can link in with zenophobia and Islamophobia, which can also be tied up with separate national narratives. 

	the fragile and historically recent gains which have been made in women’s equality. Muslim covering carries the spectre of a return to patriarchal oppression.  That explains why there is so often an unexamined – and false – assumption that fathers or husbands must have made Muslim women cover. 

	science and rationality. Covering signals the return of religion – a superstitious, irrational force which was meant to have been consigned to the dustbin of pre-modern history. It threatens to undermine the sovereignty of science and the inevitability of scientific progress.  

	individualism and self-expression. Covering is read as a frightening return to conformity and unfreedom. The individual must be being subordinated to a group and its mores. This conviction takes a particular form when individuality is identified with sexual self-expression, as it is particularly in the case of women. Not making oneself sexually attractive is regarded as repressive, unnatural, and offensive. 

In conversation and interviews I have heard many British people say that they experience face covering as a personal affront. It is ‘rude’, ‘scary’, and excluding. And so it is, from a viewpoint which cherishes the ideal of an open society. 




I’ve been looking in some detail at the Muslim covering controversy, and trying to explain why a simple piece of cloth evokes such powerful emotional and moral reactions amongst many Europeans, including European politicians. 

My answer is that it is natural and unsurprising that a material symbol evoke such powerful reactions, because our moral life works at the level of symbols and feelings. To understand why that should be, and to explain that this is not some falling away from true morality and reason, I have drawn on a range of disciplines to present an account of values which shows how they are integral to our embodied interactions with the world which mostly take place at a sub- or semi-conscious level. We evaluate constantly; that is the only way we can exist in and make sense of our world. Our evaluations are guided by personally- and socially-endorsed moral symbols and narratives, which enable us to assimilate our emergent experience to existing experience and evaluation – our own and that of society more widely. Most of the time these evaluative guides serve us well, but sometimes they can mislead. We do well then, to become more self-conscious about them, and to lay them before the light of reason and debate. 

My argument is not that the abstract values like freedom and equality which are used to frame the debate are irrelevant or unimportant. They are vital for rational, public debate. However, my argument is that unless we understand that their meaning derives from the more emotive and motivating symbols and stories which animate them, and give them meaning for those who employ them, and unless we are prepared to examine those symbols and stories critically, intercultural encounter will remain superficial and value clashes irresolvable.  

Take the concept of freedom. For opponents, freedom consists in not wearing a religiously-endorsed piece of cloth. For proponents, freedom consists in being able to wear a religiously-endorsed piece of cloth. How do you move on from here? By probing why freedom has such different meanings, by considering what sacred narratives and symbols animate it and give it meaning for each party. So the western feminist may tell a tale of how she or her foremothers had to reject what their fathers (in the flesh and in God) wanted them to do in order to be allowed into the house of the fathers. And a Muslim woman may tell of how covering has allowed her to gain the same respect of her religious community, relate to God, defy her parents, make her feel proud and self-confident, enter public space on equal terms with her brothers, and gain a clearer sense of identity in a country in which she would otherwise just be another ‘immigrant’.

In other words, we should not imagine that intercultural encounter is easy, or that it can be conducted in an ideal speech situation when that means a sort of academic seminar. Because we are dealing with ultimate guiding commitments which form our very identity – personal and social – inter-cultural counter will very often be about visceral repulsions and attractions and strong emotions. Far from shying away from that, we should try to go deeper – into the heart of the sacred commitments which guide and animate the different parties involved. I am not suggesting that we abandon our own moral commitments, far from it. I am suggesting it is important to engage with the symbolic and narrative complexes which animate our own moral commitments and those of fellow-citizens from different cultures and backgrounds – and that that is likely to mean serious participation in different ways of life rather than having a newspaper debate. 
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